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THE PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM:
WHAT HAS DURA'S EFFECT BEEN ON THE




When Congress passed the Securities Act it "did not take
away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of
himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making
a fool of him."' To this end, securities laws provided investors
with protections by broadly prohibiting fraudulent activity in
connection with the registration, sale, or purchase of a
security.2  Regulators found that state "blue sky" laws
enacted in the early twentieth century inadequately protected
investors from promoters selling stock because state
regulators had done little to counter the manipulation of
stock prices or other deceptive practices leading up to the
Stock Market Crash of 1929.' To counter the rampant
market abuses that led up to the 1929 Crash, the Securities
Act of 1934 was developed to promote the disclosure of
information, and to prevent fraud.4 The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Act), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), are charged with the protecting investors,
* Santa Clara School of Law, J.D. 2009; University of San Diego, B.A. 2003.
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1. 1 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 128 (2d ed. 1961), quoted in
Michael J. Harbers, Comment, Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation:
Section 11 Strikes Back, 21 STAN. L. REV. 171, 182 (1968).
2. DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 3
(2d ed. 2007).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 3.
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maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitating capital formation.5 The Act and Commission
govern private actions for damages in shareholder class
action lawsuits.6
One SEC regulation in particular, known as Rule 10b-5,
is particularly notable because it creates and regulates
federal civil liability between private parties in transactions
involving securities, which are otherwise exempt from federal
securities regulation.7  Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act forbids the "use or employ[ment of], in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."' In a
private action for damages under this section, Rule 10b-5
provides that the necessary elements include: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter,9 (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5)
economic loss, and (6) loss causation.1" Thus, it is unlawful to
make materially false statements, or omit material facts,
creating misleading statements in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.1 The statute requires
plaintiffs to bear "the burden of proving" that the defendant's
fraudulent misrepresentations "caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover."' 2 Thus Congress intended, under
the statute, to permit private securities fraud actions only
when plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the elements of
loss causation. 13 However, because of the unresolved nature
of loss causation, the requirement has recently become an
area of significant litigation.
Loss, in the securities fraud context, is the presumption
that the stock market operates on the "efficient market
theory."1 4 Efficient markets have multiple participants that
5. SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
6. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
9. Scienter is defined as, "A mental state consisting in an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
13. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
14. Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation,
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trade on a stock price in reasonable reliance that the price
reflects all public information.15 Theoretically, the market
reacts to all available information to assess the present value
of future cash flows of the corporation or firm that in turn, set
the stock price.16 Fraud infuses false information- material
to the effect on the stock- into the substantive information
underlying the stock price. 17 The overall stock price becomes
artificially inflated or deflated through the valuation of both
the underlying and fraudulent information."8 Thus the loss,
in a securities fraud case, is the decrease in stock value
attributable to the "corrective disclosure" admitting the prior
fraud."'
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Broudo,2 ° there were two distinct
approaches that circuit courts took to establish loss causation:
the price inflation approach and the price decline approach.2'
The price inflation approach focused on the time when the
plaintiff purchased stock and required a showing that the
purchase price was artificially inflated because of the
defendant's misstatements or omissions.22 The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits followed this approach.23 The price decline
approach required plaintiffs to plead that the stock price was
fraudulently inflated at the time of purchase, and that due to
that inflation the plaintiff lost some or all of the
6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 93, 95 (2006).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 96.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 108 (quoting In re IPO Sec. Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673
(S.D.N.Y 2003)).
20. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
21. Paul J. Geller, Loss Causation in the Post-Dura World, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, at 259, 263 (2006). The price
inflation approach was followed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Id. This
approach focuses on the moment the plaintiff purchased his security and
requires a showing that the purchase price was artificially inflated due to the
defendant's misconduct. Id. The plaintiff did not need to allege a subsequent
price decline. Id. The price decline approach was followed by the Second,
Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Id. Plaintiff needed to show that the
stock price was fraudulently inflated at the time of purchase, and also that
plaintiff suffered a loss of his overpayment, usually by alleging a corrective
price decline after revelation of the fraud. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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overpayment.24 Proof of this was demonstrated by showing a
corrective price decline after revelation of the fraud, and was
utilized by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits.25
The Supreme Court's decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. established a standard for loss causation at the pleadings
stage.26 However, the standard at the summary judgment
stage is not well defined.27 As a result, litigation proceeding
beyond the pleadings stage is being left in limbo and the
various circuits are interpreting the Dura decision to
establish different standards.2" The different standards are
creating uncertainty for companies facing securities suits, as
well as encouraging plaintiffs to forum shop for the most
favorable standard.29
This comment will look at the recent evolvement of the
standard for loss causation in the securities litigation. Part I
of this comment examines the pre-Dura standard for loss
causation, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the standard
with the Dura decision, and the cases interpreting the
standard in the wake of Dura. Part II identifies the issues
facing the Supreme Court with the varying post-Dura
standards. Part III analyzes the various circuit standards
and identifies their strengths and weaknesses. Part IV
recommends that the Supreme Court adopt a combination of
the Seventh and Fifth Circuit's standards for loss causation
at summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The State of the Law Prior to Dura
Prior to Dura, courts had difficulty determining a
standard for loss causation because the various circuits
followed various standards. Several circuits required a
securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market
theory to plead and prove a causal connection between the
alleged fraud and the investment's subsequent decline in
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
27. See id. at 347-48.
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See infra Part I.B.
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price." Meanwhile, other circuits merely required plaintiffs
to allege that the price on the date of purchase was inflated
due to the misrepresentation.3 The Dura Court rejected the
latter approach when it held that the Ninth Circuit approach
was inadequate.2
Before the decision in Dura, the various circuits relied on
the two competing standards, the price decline approach and
the price inflation approach, to define the requirements for
establishing loss causation at the summary judgment stage.3
The Supreme Court's decision in Dura has sparked debate as
to whether the standard for loss causation at summary
judgment needs to be evaluated in light of Dura.3 4  Before
Dura was decided, however, courts in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits relied on two markedly different standards for loss
causation, which are illustrated in the following subsections.
1. The Seventh Circuit Approach
Pre-Dura, plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit relied on the
price decline approach, which was the standard established in
Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., to anticipate the
extent of loss causation that must be established at summary
judgment.35 In Caremark, Corham negotiated with Caremark
to buy its home infusion business.36 Caremark accepted the
terms of the transaction based on Coram's representation
that it would focus on the home infusion market.37 Without
Caremark's knowledge, Coram was negotiating
simultaneously to merge with Lincare, a provider of
respiratory services.3  When the planned merger with
Lincare was announced, Coram's stock value dropped along
30. Geller, supra note 21, at 263.
31. See, e.g., Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003),
rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
32. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.
33. Geller, supra note 21, at 263.
34. Lyle Roberts & Paul Chalmers, Lower Courts Will Determine Impact of
Supreme Court's Securities Fraud Suit Ruling, WLF LEGAL BACKGROUNDER,
May 20, 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/052005LBRoberts.pdf.
35. Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 649-50 (7th
Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 647.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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with the value of Coram's notes.39 Caremark stated that had
it known of the merger negotiations, it would have revalued
the notes on the date of closing.4 ° Caremark further claimed
damages due to the difference in the note value as
represented.41
The court in Caremark held that the requirement of loss
causation for a 10b-5 claim required that plaintiffs allege that
they were in fact injured by the misstatements or omissions
of which they complained.42 Described as "nothing more than
the standard common law fraud rule," this definition of loss
causation did not require the plaintiff to plead that all its loss
was attributed to the misstatement or omission.43  This
standard appeared to run counter to the requirement that
securities fraud be plead with particularity.' The price
decline approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit was also
followed by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits.45
2. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff needed to prove both
transactional causation 46 and loss causation to establish a
securities fraud claim. 47  The violation required that the
plaintiff engaged in the securities transaction, and that some
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant caused the
harm.48 Plaintiffs established their case by stating the
alleged misrepresentation and inferring that the
misrepresentation caused the harm.49  To establish a loss
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir.
1997).
42. Id. at 649.
43. Id. at 649 (citation omitted).
44. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).Rule 9(b), which is the pleading
standard in securities litigation, requires that certain facts be plead with
particularity, thus requiring plaintiffs to detail specific information prior to
conducting any formal discovery. Id.
45. Geller, supra note 21, at 263.
46. Transactional causation, much like traditional causation, is
demonstrated through a showing that the plaintiff would not have purchased
the stock but for the fraud. Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-
the-Market Actions, 31 J. Corp. L. 829, 831 (2006).
47. See McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 819-21 (9th Cir. 1992).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 821.
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causation defense at the summary judgment stage,
defendants needed to prove, "as a matter of law, that the
depreciation of the value of [a plaintiffs] stock resulted from
factors other than the alleged false and misleading
statements."5 0  Summary judgment was proper only if
defendants demonstrated that no rational jury could find that
the market was misled.51 This standard was extremely
generous to plaintiffs, and contravened Congressional intent
to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery when
plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional
elements of causation and loss. 52 Securities regulations were
not intended to provide investors with broad insurance
against market losses, but were meant instead to protect
individuals against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause.53
In Provenz v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the
decision in McGonigle v. Combs 4 to hold that, once plaintiffs
established loss causation by simply alleging that the false
and misleading statements touch upon the reasons for the
investment's decline in value, the defendants bore a heavy
burden to dispute the allegations.55 In McGonigle v. Combs,
investors in a private placement sued the co-owners of
Spendthrift, as well as its consultants, attorneys, investment
bank, accounting firm and commercial bank, alleging
fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and violation of
Washington's and Kentucky's Blue Sky laws.56 The court
held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the loss causation
requirement because they did not show that the existence of
the allegedly omitted facts reduced the proper valuation of
their investment. 57  The court determined there was not
enough of a causal connection between the material
50. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996).
51. Id.
52. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
53. Id. at 345.
54. McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992).
55. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1492.
56. McGonigle, 968 F.2d at 815-16. State Blue Sky laws are laws which
attempt to curtail "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of 'blue sky,' ";they aim "to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns,
visionary oil wells, distant gold mines and other like fraudulent exploitations."
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (citations omitted).
57. McGonigle, 968 F.2d at 820.
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misrepresentation and the loss. 8  One major distinction
between Provenz and McGonigle is that the burden previously
placed on the plaintiff in McGonigle, was shifted to the
defendant in Provenz.59
The Provenz plaintiffs alleged that the value of their
stock was artificially inflated because the defendants
recognized revenue before it was earned and failed to disclose
to the market information about their products and
forecasts.6 ° The court held that the defendants had not
provided enough evidence to establish that they were entitled
to a loss causation defense.6' The court further held that
plaintiffs could establish loss causation by simply alleging
that the false and misleading statements touch upon the
reasons for the investment's decline in value, placing a heavy
burden on defendants to dispute those allegations.62 The
court determined that the defendants bore the heavy burden
of proof, and that they needed to prove that the depreciation
in the stock's value resulted from other factors, and not from
the alleged false and misleading statements.63 The Provenz
decision left the Ninth Circuit with the lowest burden on
plaintiffs pleading loss causation, and highest standard for
defendants to overcome to succeed in dismissing the action at
summary judgment.64 This ran counter to Congress' intent in
eliminating the ability for strike suits65 to proceed, and
created a ripe issue for Supreme Court review.66
Three years after Provenz, the Ninth Circuit relaxed its
standard even further with its decision in Binder v.
58. Id. at 821.
59. Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1492.
60. Id. at 1482-83.
61. Id. at 1492.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. For a comparison of established standards, see supra Parts I.A.1-2.
65. Strike suits are securities fraud suits filed by a plaintiffs attorney for
nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated value, not for the
merits of the suit. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004). A
settlement is the most sensible option for a corporation facing a strike suit
because of the enormous discovery and defense costs associated with the suits.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995).
66. Chuan Li, Gauging the Hurdle to Strike Suits: Reconciling the Circuit
Split over the Proper Interpretation of the Heightened Pleading Standard Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 26 J. CORP. L. 435, 435-36
(2001).
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Gillespie.67 In Binder, the Ninth Circuit followed the price
inflation approach when it held that the loss causation
requirement was satisfied when the plaintiff showed that the
misrepresentation "touches upon the reasons for the
investment's decline in value."68 The standard relied on the
idea that the plaintiff needed to show that the fraud caused,
or at least had something to do with, the decline in the
investment's value after the securities transaction. 69  This
standard was even more relaxed than the previous Ninth
Circuit standard, which required plaintiffs to show that
allegedly admitted facts reduced the proper valuation of an
investment. °
B. The Decision in Dura and Its Impact
The various standards the courts were using led to the
inability for plaintiffs and defendants to anticipate the
outcome of proceedings in various circuits.71 The result of the
split was a variation in the federal securities laws between
circuits, which led to the Supreme Court's decision.72 The
Supreme Court explained its decision in Dura with the
understanding that the statute requires plaintiffs to bear "the
burden of proving" that the defendant's misrepresentations
"caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover."73
Thus, under the statute, the Supreme Court held that
Congress intended to permit private securities fraud actions
only when plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the elements
of loss causation.
In Dura, plaintiffs filed a securities fraud class action,
alleging that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and some of its
managers and directors made misrepresentations about FDA
approval of a new asthmatic spray device.74 However, the
complaint failed to adequately establish a causal connection
between the spray device misrepresentation and the economic
loss. 75  Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that an
67. Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1066 (citation omitted).
69. Id.
70. See McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992).
71. Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 345-46.
74. Id. at 339.
75. Id. at 340.
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investor claiming securities fraud under the Securities
Exchange Act could not satisfy the requirement of proving
that the fraud caused an economic loss simply by alleging
that the price of the security on the date of purchase was
inflated because of a misrepresentation."
While Dura was a pleadings case, the Court also
discussed the loss causation proof requirement.7' The Court
discussed in dicta that:
When the purchaser subsequently resells... shares, even
at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the
earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other
events, which taken separately or together account for
some or all of that price .... Other things being equal, the
longer the time between purchase and sale, the more
likely that this is so, i.e., the more likely ... other factors
caused the loss.7"
The Court made the distinction that touching upon a loss
does not equal causing a loss, effectively overruling the Ninth
Circuit's standard. 9 The Dura decision recognized that when
a purchaser resells shares, even at a lower price, that lower
price could reflect a number of things including changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or events
other than the misrepresentation and later disclosure.80
The Supreme Court's decision in Dura held that several
proof requirements must be satisfied to maintain a private
securities fraud claim." First, the "relevant truth" must have
started to "leak out" before a shareholder can claim recovery
for losses.8 2  Second, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's misrepresentation or omission proximately
caused the plaintiffs loss.8 3 Third, inflation caused by the
76. Id. at 342.
77. Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
78. Id. at 342-43.
79. See id. at 343.
80. Laurie B. Smilan, Is Dura Durable? Are the Lower Courts Reducing
Loss Causation to Its Lowest Common Denominator, in SECURITIES LITIGATION
& ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, supra note 21, at 355, 357.
81. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 346.
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alleged fraud can be dissipated in many ways (i.e., not only
through specific disclosure), thus plaintiffs must show that
there was a subsequent decline in price after the specific
fraud was disclosed.
8 4
Since the decision in Dura, many circuits (the Ninth
Circuit in particular) have established new "loss causation"
standards using Dura as their guideline. The Ninth Circuit
had been utilizing the standard promulgated by Provenz and
McGonigle until the Supreme Court issued the Dura ruling. 5
Because the holding in Dura establishes a higher standard
for loss causation at the pleading stage, it logically follows
that, in future decisions, there will be a similar, if not more
stringent, standard needed at summary judgment. The cases
that immediately followed Dura clarified those standards to
some extent.
C. The Circuit Cases Interpreting Dura With Various
Outcomes
1. The Seventh Circuit's Formulaic Approach to Loss
Causation
Some courts have interpreted Dura liberally, applying it
beyond the pleadings stage.8 6 The approach taken by the
Seventh Circuit, 7 is that loss causation may be proved by
demonstrating that a loss was proximately caused by
disclosure of the fraud, and that the specific cause of the loss
must be demonstrated in detail.8  In Tricontinental
Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, the plaintiff
corporation and stock owner sued the corporation that
acquired it, claiming negligent misrepresentation, common-
law fraud and securities fraud.8 9  Tricontinental alleged
84. Id. at 342.
85. Id. at 336; see also 4 LEwIS D. LOWENFELS & ALAN R BROMBERG,
BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §
7:515 (2d ed. 2008).
86. See, e.g., Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
475 F.3d 824, 844 (7th Cir. 2007); McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418
(3d Cir. 2007); In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008).
87. See generally Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 844 (7th Cir. 2007); Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482
F.3d 991, 994-95 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501,
536 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
88. See Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 844; Ray, 482 F.3d at 994-95.
89. Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 827.
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PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC) had negligently
misrepresented statements about the financial worth of its
client, Anicom, Inc. (Anicom) during Anicom's acquisition of
Tricontinental's assets.9 ° Tricontinental merely alleged that
Anicom's 1998 and 1999 financial statements exposed it to
misrepresentations and caused its losses.91 Tricontinental
stated in its complaint that Anicom's disclosure in 2000 that
it was in the process of investigating its 1998 and 1999
financial statements for irregularities, suggested problems
with the 1997 statement.92 The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not
adequately pleaded loss causation.9 3  The district court
agreed, found in favor of defendants, and dismissed the
complaint.9
4
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding,
stating that the plaintiffs failed to plead the circumstances in
sufficient detail to satisfy loss causation. 95 The court felt
Tricontinental needed to allege that the 1997 audit contained
a material misrepresentation, causing a loss to Tricontinental
when the misrepresentation became "generally known."96
The "statement" pointed out by Tricontinental did not
indicate any problems or irregularities in the 1997 audited
financial statements, and therefore was insufficient to state a
claim for securities fraud.97 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held
that the district court did not err when it dismissed
Tricontinental's 10b-5 claim. 9
In another decision following the Seventh Circuit, In re
Motorola Securities Litigation, the court examined the post-
Dura standard for loss causation.99 In Motorola, plaintiffs
alleged that the company made materially false and
misleading statements and omitted material facts behind the
financing of a deal with Telsim, a Turkish
90. Id.
91. Id. at 844.
92. Id. at 843.
93. Id. at 831.
94. Id. at 832.
95. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d
824, 844 (7th Cir. 2007).
96. Id. at 843.
97. Id. at 843-44.
98. Id. at 844.
99. Id. at 535-39.
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telecommunications corporation. 00 The Motorola court then
went on to analyze the corrective disclosures alleged by
plaintiffs. 1 ' Several disclosures did raise factual issues as to
whether the disclosures established loss causation and were
therefore improper for summary judgment. 0 2 However, the
Motorola court analyzed the causal connection between $1.7
billion in undisclosed financing of Telsim by Motorola, and a
subsequent drop in stock price following the disclosure that
there would be shortfall in sales revenue and earnings
attributed to general economic downturn and inventory
correction. 0 3 The court held that this particular disclosure
did not meet the standard for loss causation at summary
judgment and dismissed the disclosure from the action.0 4
In Ray v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., another decision
illustrating the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Dura,
investors in a wireless data services corporation brought a
securities fraud claim against Citigroup Global Markets, the
Citigroup parent-corporation, and John Spatz, an investment
advisor employed by Citigroup. °5 The plaintiffs included
more than one hundred retail investors who purchased
millions of dollars worth of SmartServ Online, Inc. (SSOL)
stock.0 6 The plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that the
defendants fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to purchase
SSOL stock by making misrepresentations, though
defendants knew of SSOL's contract problems and knew it
was a risky investment. 07 Had plaintiffs been told the truth,
they claimed, they would have sold the acquired shares and
108 Tepanifwould have refrained from purchasing more. The plaintiffs
claimed that Spatz's and Citigroup's misrepresentation were
the cause for SSOL's share price decline, because SSOL never
had the contracts, revenues or funding as Spatz claimed.0 9
Plaintiffs asserted that this information demonstrated the
loss in SSOL's share value was proximately caused by the
100. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501, 507-08 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
101. See id. at 513.
102. Id. at 561.
103. Id. at 547.
104. Id.
105. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 992 (7th Cir. 2007).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 993.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 994.
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alleged misrepresentations.1" ° The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
holding that plaintiffs did not introduce enough evidence to
substantiate the loss causation element.' However, other
courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have followed Dura more
conservatively.
2. The Ninth Circuit's Alternative Interpretation of Dura
As Applied to Summary Judgment
The Ninth Circuit, with the standard established by In re
Daou Systems, Inc. ,112 and In re Gilead Securities
Litigation,"' took an alternative interpretation of Dura. In
these cases, the courts held that a plaintiff does not need to
show the misrepresentation or omission is the only reason for
the price drop, but it must be a "substantial" cause."'
In In re Daou Systems, Inc., plaintiffs claimed Daou
Systems, Inc. (Daou) fraudulently inflated the prices of its
stock by reporting revenues before they were earned."5 The
pleadings included the progress account, the approximate
amount by which earnings and revenues were overstated, the
dates of some of the related transactions and the identities of
the customers and companies involved in the transactions." 6
The Ninth Circuit permitted the claims to proceed, reiterated
the decision in Dura, and added that a plaintiff "is not
required to show 'that a misrepresentation was the sole
reason for the investment's decline in value .... As long as
the misrepresentation is one substantial cause of the
investment's decline in value, other contributing forces will
not bar recovery under the loss causation requirement ... '
"117
More recently, the Ninth Circuit evaluated loss causation
at the pleading stage with its decision in In re Gilead Sciences
110. Id. at 994-95.
111. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 996-97 (7th Cir.
2007).
112. In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
113. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., No. C03-4999, 2006 WL 1320466 (N.D. Cal.
May 12, 2006).
114. Id. at *9; Daou, 411 F.3d at 1025.
115. Daou, 411 F.3d at 1012.
116. Id. at 1018-19.
117. Id. (quoting Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1997)) (citations omitted).
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Securities Litigation.'18 In Gilead, plaintiffs filed suit against
a biopharmaceutical company specializing in the development
and marketing of treatments for life-threatening diseases,
including an antiretroviral agent used to treat HIV." 9
Plaintiffs alleged that Gilead and its officers fraudulently
promoted and marketed the drug with off-label, false and
misleading statements in violation of FDA regulations. 2 '
Plaintiffs pointed to statements made through company press
releases that attributed that gains were due to an increase in
prescriptions, when in reality the increase was due to
wholesaler stockpiling and were thus one time increases.' 2 '
The company also failed to disclose a warning letter it
received from the FDA regarding the off-label marketing that
plaintiffs believed led to the wholesaler stockpiling.'22
In the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed there was a
causal relationship between the increases in sales resulting
from the off-label marketing, the FDA letter's effect on
subsequent drug orders as well as the letter's effect on the
overall stock price.'23  The Gilead plaintiffs specifically
pointed to a press release disclosing the failure to report the
wholesale stockpiling on October 28, 2003, and a subsequent
decline in stock price on the following day, October 29,
2003.124 The Ninth Circuit held that the facts, if taken as
true, plausibly established loss causation and permitted the
claim to go forward. 2  The court held that so long as
plaintiffs establish plausible loss causation by demonstrating
facts that would raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
would reveal evidence of loss causation, dismissal at the
pleadings stage would be inappropriate. 126 Still, some circuits
have gone even further in their interpretation of Dura, as
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit.
118. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 1050-51.
120. Id. at 1051.
121. Id. at 1052.
122. Id. at 1052-53.
123. Id. at 1057.
124. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008).
125. Id. at 1057.
126. Id. at 1058.
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3. The Fifth Circuit's Recent Decisions Addressing Loss
Causation
The Fifth Circuit established the highest standard to
date, with its holdings in Ryan v. Flowserve Corp.,127
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,"8 and Oscar Private
Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc. 129 In Ryan v.
Flowserve Corp., plaintiffs asserted that Flowserve, a
manufacturer of pumps, seals, and valves went on a massive
acquisition binge and as a result, were in need of equity
infusion, in violation of the company's debt covenants. 3 '
Plaintiffs then asserted that various defendants issued
"overly optimistic predictions.., to conceal the fraud."131 The
defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the burden of loss causation.'32
Defendants asserted that plaintiffs could not demonstrate the
causal connection between the alleged misstatements and the
corresponding losses caused by those misstatements. 133
In Oscar, defendant Allegiance was a national
telecommunications provider that sold local and long distance
telephone services, broadband access, web-hosting and
telecom equipment. 3 1 Plaintiffs alleged that several of
Allegiance's executives fraudulently misrepresented
Allegiance's line-installation count in three quarter
announcements.135  When plaintiffs moved for class
certification, the Fifth Circuit took an interlocutory appeal to
establish whether certification was proper.'36 The Fifth
Circuit determined that the court could not infer lost
causation from just one of several negative announcements;
rather, the circuit found that loss causation required
empirical proof that the corrective disclosure was more than
127. Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560, 570, 580-81 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
128. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
129. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
270 (5th Cir. 2007).




134. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 262.
135. Id. at 263.
136. Id. at 262.
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just present.1 37  The Third Circuit further endorsed this
approach with its decision in McCabe v. Ernst & Young,
LLP.13
8
4. The Third Circuit's Holdings Addressing the Issue
The Third Circuit has followed the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation, with its decision in McCabe v. Ernst & Young,
LLP. 39 In McCabe, principals of Applied Tactical Systems
(ATS) sued the auditors of Vertex, the company acquiring
ATS, for securities fraud, common law fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation." 0 The plaintiffs claimed that there were
merger-related stock registration defaults and threatened
litigation associated with the information that had been
omitted from the merger's financial statements and
documentation.' The defendants moved for, and were
granted, summary judgment at the district court level.'42 The
district court held that the plaintiffs suffered no damages
resulting from the alleged fraud, thus summary judgment
was appropriate as there was no loss causation; plaintiffs
appealed."' The Third Circuit exercised de novo review'" to
evaluate the expert testimony presented by both parties as to
whether the alleged omissions in fact caused the plaintiffs
economic loss. 1 4  The McCabe court found that the district
court had not erred in finding in favor of the defendants on
summary judgment.146
5. The Second Circuit's Evaluation of the Post-Dura
Cases
The Second Circuit also rendered a standard for loss
causation at summary judgment. The circuit court as well as
district court decisions have established clear guidelines on
137. Id. at 271.
138. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 420 (3d Cir. 2007).
139. Id. at 428-29.
140. Id. at 422.
141. Id. at 421.
142. Id. at 423.
143. Id.
144. De novo is the proper standard of review for summary judgment
appeals. See, e.g., Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 263 (3d Cir. 2006).
145. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 434-38 (3d Cir. 2007).
146. Id. at 438-39.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
loss causation.147 In Lentell, the plaintiffs alleged that Merrill
Lynch issued false and misleading reports, recommending
that investors purchase shares of 24/7 Real Media, Inc., and
Interliant, Inc. though analysts did not believe those
companies were good investments. 48  Plaintiffs further
alleged that Merrill Lynch's analysts issued the falsely
optimistic recommendations to cultivate the Firm's
investment-banking business.'49 The Second Circuit states
that fraud is the proximate cause of an investment loss if the
risk that caused the loss was within the potential risks
concealed by those misstatements or omissions.
15 0
The Southern District of New York was one of the first
courts to examine loss causation at summary judgment.' 51
The recent Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital
Management, LLC decision was guided by the previous
Lentell standard. 152 In January of 2001, the CEO and several
shareholders of the Internet Law Library (INL) filed suit
against Southridge Capital Management, LLC (Southridge)
claiming fraud, misrepresentation of material facts, and
manipulation of INL's stock arising from several financial
transactions. 5 3 Defendants counterclaimed, alleging that the
plaintiffs failed to disclose the criminal records of two of INL's
executives.15 Here, the court evaluated granting summary
judgment sua sponte 55 to the INL counterclaim defendants if
there was no showing of a genuine issue of material fact.'56
The INL court found insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude that the counterclaim defendants
had, through their failures to disclose, caused the economic
147. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172-78 (2d Cir. 2005);
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 01-CV-6600,
2007 WL 1222583, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2005).
148. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 165-66.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 172-75; see Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d at
266.
151. See Internet Law Library, Inc., 2007 WL 1222583, at * 1-3.
152. Id. at *3.
153. Id. at *1 n.1.
154. Id. at *4.
155. Id. at *2 (citing SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp.
2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
156. Id.
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loss.157 Thus, Southridge failed to provide sufficient evidence
to prove that the concealment of the criminal convictions by
INL in fact caused the loss, when the concealed information
prevented the financial transaction from occurring. 158
The various standards throughout the different circuits
demonstrate a need for clarification of the issue. Without a
clear-cut resolution, plaintiffs are forum shop circuits with
the most liberal standards, and companies are unsure of what
to expect in securities suits. Clarification on the standard
would provide guidance for companies and plaintiffs seeking
to pursue and defend potential fraud.
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The plaintiff in a securities claim bears "the burden of
proving that the act or omission of the defendant ... caused
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."159
However, few circuits are clear as to what the standard of
proof requires at summary judgment. The effect of
causational uncertainty in securities fraud cases is the
increased potential for "strike suits.' 160  "Strike suits" are
inequitable claims with a low probability of success, but they
have the ability to compel a defendant to settle for large
amounts of money in excess of the claim's actual value.161
Because of the severe stigma attached to the defendants
charged with a securities fraud violation, there are strong
incentives to settle strike suits, giving further improper
incentives for plaintiffs to bring those so-called strike suits. 162
To avoid these situations, the standard for loss causation
must be clearly defined, so that plaintiffs and defendants can
rely on those standards to limit the potential for strike suits.
157. Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 01-
CV-6600, 2007 WL 1222583 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2005). The court looked at
the fact that the criminal convictions were more than five years old at the time
of the financial transactions. Id.
158. Id. at *4.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
160. See William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud With
Particularity-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context:
Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 851, 864
(1995) (discussing the potential for plaintiffs abuse of the securities fraud
claim).
161. See id. at 864-65; see also Surovwitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
363, 371 (1966) (discussing the filing of strike suits as methods of coercion).
162. Feinstein, supra note 160, at 865.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Prior to Dura, there were two separate approaches that
circuit courts took to establish loss causation: the price
inflation approach and the price decline approach.163 The
price inflation approach focused on the point at which the
plaintiff purchased stock and required a showing that the
purchase price was artificially inflated because of the
defendant's misstatements or omissions." This approach
was followed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.16 The second
standard, the price decline approach, required plaintiffs to
show the stock price was fraudulently inflated at the time of
purchase, and that due to the inflation, the plaintiff lost some
or all of the overpayment.'66 The allegation was generally
substantiated through showing a corrective price decline after
revelation of the fraud, and this approach was followed by the
Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.'67
Dura evaluated the proof needed at the pleadings stage,
but did not establish a clear guideline for lower courts to
follow at the summary judgment stage. 6 ' Dura did not
articulate what specifically constituted a revelation of the
alleged fraud. 69  Also, the decision rejected the Ninth
Circuit's price inflation approach, but did not adopt its own
approach, or advocate another circuit's standard. 7 ' The
Court rejected the defendant's request for a rigid rule that
loss causation could be established by specified corrective
disclosures 7' of the relevant truth connected to an economic
163. Geller, supra note 21, at 263. The price inflation approach was followed
by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Id. "This approach focuses on the moment
the plaintiff purchased his security and requires a showing that the purchase
price was artificially inflated due to the defendant's misconduct. The plaintiff
does not need to allege a subsequent price decline." Id. The price decline
approach was followed by the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.
Id. Plaintiffs needed to "show that the stock price was fraudulently inflated at
the time of purchase, and also that he lost some or all of his overpayment,





168. Madge S. Thorsen et al., supra note 14, at 123.
169. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
170. See id. at 342-46.
171. A corrective disclosure occurs when a disclosure is in fact misleading
when made, and the speaker learns of this and corrects the statement.
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990). Companies are
under a duty to make corrective disclosures once the original statement is found
to be misleading. Id.
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loss prior to recovery. 17 2 In addition, in the cases following
Dura, no circuit courts or district courts have adopted a rigid
definition of the type of corrective disclosures necessary to
prove loss causation.17 3 Because the Supreme Court refused
to accept the Ninth Circuit's liberal standards, but failed to
establish specific guidelines, many circuits are now reaching
the issue, and are interpreting Dura to establish varied
standards of the proof necessary for loss causation at
summary judgment.174  The various standards create
inconsistency throughout the circuits and leave parties
guessing as to how to properly plead or defend securities
fraud claims. Thus it is important to create a uniform
standard of loss causation at summary judgment to avoid
that uncertainty. This comment will evaluate the separate
standards, and make recommendations for courts to follow
based on the analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
As previously stated, a private action for damages under
the Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
includes the following elements: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5)
economic loss, and (6) loss causation. 7 5 The statute insists
that securities fraud complaints:
[1] specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, [2] the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, ... [3] state with particularity all facts on
which that belief is formed . . . [and] [4] state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 76
The statute states that plaintiffs bear "the burden of
proving that ... [the defendant's misrepresentations] caused
the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."177
Thus, under the statute, Congress intended to permit private
172. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42.
173. Geller, supra note 21, at 264.
174. See infra Part III.
175. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2006). The required state of mind is that
the defendant acted with scienter (guilty knowledge). Dura, 544 U.S. at 341.
177. § 78u-4(b)(4).
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securities fraud actions only when plaintiffs adequately allege
and prove the elements of loss causation.
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, courts may grant summary judgment when the
pleadings and record evidence "show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." 7 ' The court must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and all inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's
favor. 79 Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden
by showing that its opponent failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish an essential element of the case where
the opponent bears the burden of proof.' 0
. To survive a motion for summary judgment in securities
fraud cases, plaintiffs must provide an event study,'8 1 or
similar analyses, to show whether any loss was caused by the
defendant's conduct as opposed to other market factors." 2
They must do more than show the alleged fraud touched upon
the stock price; plaintiffs must show that their loss directly
relates to the alleged fraud.'8 3 Plaintiffs bear the burden of
establishing every element of a securities claim, a heavy
burden in a summary judgment motion. 8 1 Alternatively, a
defendant need only establish that a plaintiff is unable to
proffer factual or legal support for any necessary element of a
claim to overcome summary judgment. 185 A court will only
grant summary judgment if, after considering the parties'
briefs, pleadings, depositions and affidavits, "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and.., the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "186
178. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
179. Chaplin v. Nationscredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-250, 255 (1986)).
180. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
181. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
271 (5th Cir. 2007). An event study showing loss causation is an empirically-
based showing that the corrective disclosure was more than just present at the
scene. Id.
182. Id.
183. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
184. Id. at 345-46.
185. See Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 649-50
(1997).
186. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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A. The Seventh Circuit's Liberal Standard
Several circuit courts have interpreted Dura at the
summary judgment phase, and have formulated various
standards for loss causation. The Seventh Circuit requires
defendants, at both the pleading and summary judgment
stages, to "apportion and quantify which part of [the
company's] loss is attributable to disclosures . . . and which
part might [be] attributable to other factors."187
Tricontinental Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP'18 illustrates the Seventh Circuit's liberal approach to
loss causation. In Tricontinental, the plaintiff corporation
and stock owner sued the corporation that acquired it,
claiming negligent misrepresentation, common-law fraud and
securities fraud. 189 Tricontinental alleged
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC) had negligently
misrepresented statements about the financial worth of its
client, Anicom, Inc. (Anicom) during Anicom's acquisition of
Tricontinental's assets.1 90  Although Tricontinental's
complaints were dismissed at the pleadings stage,1 91 its loss
causation analysis was useful in creating the Seventh
Circuit's standard.
Tricontinental, in its reply brief, maintained that the
Supreme Court's decision in Dura did not require the
precision in pleadings that the district court required in its
dismissal.1 92 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that
"Dura stress[ed] that the complaint must ' "specify" each
misleading statement,' and that there must be 'a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the
loss,' not simply that the misrepresentation '"touche[d] upon"
a later economic loss .... "193
Tricontinental was a pleading case, but another Seventh
Circuit decision utilized similar reasoning in directly
addressing the issue of loss causation at summary
187. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp 2d 501, 551 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
188. Tricontinental Industries, Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475
F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007).
189. Id. at 827.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 843.
193. Id. (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005))
(citations omitted).
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judgment."' In Ray v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
plaintiffs asserted that the company and an investment
advisor's misrepresentations were the cause for a share price
decline. 9 5 A group of disappointed investors who lost millions
of dollars after the shares they had purchased of SmartServ
Online, Inc. (SSOL) collapsed in value, sued John Spatz, an
investment advisor, his employer, Citigroup Global Markets,
Inc., and the employer's parent company, Citigroup, Inc.
(collectively, Citigroup) because SSOL never had the
contracts, revenues or funding as Spatz, in his capacity as
advisor, claimed.'96 Plaintiffs asserted that this information
demonstrated the loss in share value was proximately caused
by the alleged misrepresentations.'97 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, holding that plaintiffs did not substantiate their
loss causation claim. 198
In disagreeing with the Ray plaintiffs, the Seventh
Circuit examined three ways in which the plaintiffs could
have demonstrated loss causation: (1) the materialization of
the risk standard,'99 (2) the fraud on the market standard, 00
and finally (3) the risk-free20' approach.2 2  The court
194. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 994.
196. Id. at 992.
197. Id. at 994-95.
198. Id. at 996-97.
199. The materialization of the risk standard requires plaintiffs to prove that
"it was the very facts about which the defendant lied which caused [the
plaintiffs] injuries." Id. (quoting Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp.,
113 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1997).
200.
"The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the
defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is
no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on
misrepresentations."
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
201. The risk-free approach is apparent when "a broker falsely assures [his
customer] that a particular investment is 'risk-free.' " Ray v. Citigroup Global
Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bastian v. Petren Res.
Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1990)). If the investment is risky, the risk
materializes, and the investment is lost, " 'there can be no presumption that but
for the misrepresentation the customer would have made an equally risky
2009] THE PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIM 589
determined very quickly that the record did not reveal
evidence sufficient to meet the first standard, without
rebuttal from plaintiffs, that the drop in the value of the
SSOL shares was attributed to market forces.2 °3 Plaintiffs
also failed to show that the value of the stock declined at the
moment the alleged misrepresentations were revealed, the
requirement Dura instituted for the fraud on the market
standard.20 4  Plaintiffs alleged that they discovered the
investment advisor's lies in June of 2002, but by that point,
the price of the shares had already collapsed.20 5  Thus,
plaintiffs could not satisfy this second standard to survive
summary judgment.2 6
Plaintiffs finally asserted that the broker gave false
assurances that the investment was risk-free. 20 7 The risk-free
theory requires that, but for the misrepresentation by the
broker, the customer would not have made the investment.0 8
However, the court reiterated that very explicit language
must be used before loss causation could be proved under this
theory.209 The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court
found no evidence that Spatz and Citibank fraudulently
assured the plaintiffs that SSOL stock was risk free, or that
the stock would survive the collapse of the market in that
industry. 20 Absent this evidence, the Seventh Circuit held
that plaintiffs failed to prove loss causation adequately and
that summary judgment in favor of the defense was
appropriate.2"
One district court case that illustrates the Seventh
Circuit's standard is the Northern District of Illinois case, In
investment.' "Id. at 996 (quoting Bastian, 892 F.2d at 685-86.)
202. Ray, 482 F.3d at 995.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 995-96.
206. Id. at 996.
207. Id.
208. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 996-97. The Seventh Circuit relied upon the Caremark, Inc. v.
Coram Healthcare Corp. decision which held that it is "not sufficient for an
investor to allege only that it would not have invested but for the fraud. ...
Rather, it is also necessary to allege that, but for the circumstances that the
fraud concealed, the investment would not have lost its value." Id. at 995
(quoting Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 648-49 (7th
Cir. 1997).
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re Motorola Securities Litigation.212 On a motion for summary
judgment, the court examined the post-Dura standard for loss
causation.213 There, plaintiffs alleged that Motorola made
materially false and misleading statements and omitted
material facts behind the financing of a deal with Telsim, a
Turkish telecommunications corporation. 214  The court held
that plaintiffs needed to prove that each "corrective
disclosure" 215 was the catalyst for an earnings shortfall in
order to be used as proof that the relevant truth was leaked to
the market in support of loss causation.216
The Motorola court fell under the jurisdiction of the
Seventh Circuit, and thus, was under the guidelines set by
Caremark.217 Caremark held that the burden rests with
defendants, on summary judgment, to show that a price drop,
occurring following a disclosure of information, did not result
from that disclosure. 2"8  The plaintiffs burden is to present
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that those price declines indeed resulted from such a
disclosure.21 9 If a plaintiff meets this burden, "the trier of fact
can determine the damages attributable to the fraudulent
conduct. '220  Thus, Motorola determined that the burden in
the Seventh Circuit rested with the defendant, at both the
pleading and summary judgment stages, to "apportion and
quantify which part of its loss is attributable to disclosures..
and which part might [be] attributable to other factors."221
B. The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Loss Causation at
Summary Judgment
The Ninth Circuit has issued several decisions following
212. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
213. Id. at 504.
214. Id. at 507-08.
215. A corrective disclosure is a disclosure that dissipates price inflation that
had resulted from misrepresentations or omissions, even if disclosure did not
specifically identify or explicitly correct previous representation or expressly
disclose particular fraudulent scheme alleged by claimant. Id. at 536-37.
216. Id. at 545.
217. Id. at 550-51 (citing Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113
F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing how Caremark was not overruled by
Dura, and was therefore still the standard in the Seventh Circuit).
218. Caremark, 113 F.3d at 647.
219. Id. at 650.
220. Id. at 649.
221. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501, 551 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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Dura, which aim at creating a loss causation standard at
summary judgment. No clear standard for loss causation at
summary judgment has materialized in the Ninth Circuit,
however, the decisions illustrating the loss causation
standard at the pleadings stage are helpful to forecast how
the circuit will rule when given the chance. The decision in
Daou, in particular, provided guidance regarding the Ninth
Circuit's standard.222 In Daou, The Ninth Circuit utilized the
Dura decision and held that a "plaintiff is not required to
show 'that a misrepresentation was the sole reason for the
investment's decline in value'. . . . 'As long as the
misrepresentation is one substantial cause of the
investment's decline in value, other contributing forces will
not bar recovery under the loss causation requirement . .. .'
,,223 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit adopted a fairly low
standard for plaintiffs to establish loss causation.
The Daou court held that plaintiffs must prove the
defendant's misrepresentation proximately caused the
221plaintiffs injury. 4 While the plaintiffs did not need to show
that the misrepresentation was the only reason for the
share's price drop, they did have to show that it was a
substantial cause of the drop. 225 Thus, plaintiffs succeeded
when they alleged that they would not have purchased the
securities but for the executive's fraud through improper
accounting, and that the drop in the stock price was the direct
result of the misstatements and caused the plaintiffs
damages. 226  Daou established the standard in the Ninth
Circuit at the pleadings stage.227 The Ninth Circuit's Daou
decision is not significantly distinguishable from what was
overruled in Dura to constitute a reliable standard. The
decision rejects the idea that Dura requires a completely
corrective disclosure at the pleadings stage, and permits a
mere leakage of troubled information instead.22  This
222. See generally In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
223. Id. at 1025 (quoting Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447




227. See id. (holding that to prove loss causation, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a causal connection between the deceptive acts that form the basis
for the claim of securities fraud and the injury suffered by the plaintiff).
228. Thorsen et al, supra note 14, at 120.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
approach is contrary to the fundamental purpose of summary
judgment. The Ninth Circuit did however publish a recent
ruling that could shed light on the loss causation standard it
would require plaintiffs to meet at the summary judgment
stage with its Gilead decision.229
In Gilead, the Ninth Circuit permitted a claim to go
forward past the pleadings stage noting that a "limited
temporal gap between the time a misrepresentation [was]
publicly revealed and the subsequent decline in stock value
[did not] render a plaintiffs theory of loss causation per se
implausible."2 30 The court made clear that loss causation was
a matter of proof and that the extent of the warning impact
must be demonstrated at the proof stage.231 Thus it would be
appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to require more of a causal
connection, demonstrating "proof' of loss causation at the
summary judgment stage, after both parties have been given
a chance to gather evidence. This would permit plaintiffs and
defendants to gather evidence to support the case, but would
prevent plaintiffs from proceeding beyond summary judgment
who had not demonstrated an element of their claim.
However, it is unclear what specific standard the Ninth
Circuit would utilize to demonstrate loss causation at
summary judgment because the Circuit has not issued a
published or unpublished case on the summary judgment
standard.
C. The Fifth Circuit's Strict Standard
District courts in the Fifth Circuit have followed notably
different standards than those in the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit requires plaintiffs not only plead
loss causation at the class certification level with some
particularity, but also with in-depth expert analysis. 2 In
Flowserve, the Fifth Circuit held that loss causation required
disclosure, and that defendants in a securities fraud case
could not be held liable for a decline in a stock price before
the alleged fraud was disclosed.233 Flowserve's corrective
229. See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055-1057 (9th Cir.
2008).
230. Id. at 1058.
231. See id. at 1057-58.
232. See Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560, 570-77 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
233. Id. at 578.
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disclosures had a negative effect on the price of Flowserve's
stock, but did not show a corrective effect on the price and
thus, were insufficient to show loss causation.234  The court
determined that the plaintiffs' losses were not caused by the
misstatements, but rather by negative information
announced in the releases.235
The Flowserve court utilized the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc.23 6  Oscar evaluated loss causation at the class
certification stage,237 however, its standard is utilized in
various district courts to determine the standard at summary
judgment, which has broadened the decision's impact.238 The
Fifth Circuit in Oscar held that plaintiffs were required to
prove that the defendants' alleged misrepresentations were
"the proximate cause of the plaintiffs economic loss. "239 The
Oscar court determined that loss causation is a fraud-on-the-
market 240 prerequisite. 241 The court held that loss causation
must be established at the class certification stage by a
preponderance of all evidence.242  This did not preclude
reexamination of the evidence supporting loss causation at
summary judgment, but established a standard requiring
empirical proof that the corrective disclosure was more than
"just present at the scene."243 It was not enough to
demonstrate expert opinion without analysis to establish loss
234. Id. at 579.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 568-83 (citing Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264-71 (5th Cir. 2007).
237. See Oscar, 487 F.3d at 262.
238. See, e.g., Ryan, 245 F.R.D. at 568-83; In re Seitel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 245
F.R.D. 263, 275 (S.D. Tex. 2007); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d
1195, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
239. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 264. Fraud-on-the-market is a doctrine that supplies a blanket
presumption that each class member has satisfied the reliance element of their
10b-5 claim. Id. The theory is that, in an efficient capital market, the market
price reflects all public information; hence an investor who purchased a stock in
such a market is harmed if the price reflects false information as a consequence
of a material misrepresentation. Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc. 422 F.3d 307,
310 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005).
241. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 268.
242. Id. at 269.
243. Id. at 271. Being more than "just present at the scene" requires
plaintiffs to demonstrate that some or all of the drop was attributable
specifically to the corrective disclosure; this can be done through expert in-depth
analysis of the events. Id.
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causation.244 Those experts needed to examine the actual
disclosures and documents and to give in-depth
assessments. 245  The court was unwilling to infer loss
causation merely because one of several negative
announcements could demonstrate loss causation.246
247 itWith the decision in Oscar, and its choice to evaluate
the standard for loss causation at the district court level for
summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit has taken a markedly
pro-defendant stance. By requiring that loss causation not
only be pleaded at the class certification level with some
particularity but also with in-depth expert analysis,248 the
standard set is slightly higher than the one established in the
Seventh Circuit. Because the Fifth Circuit takes a
significantly different approach to loss causation at summary
judgment phase than the other circuits, it is unclear whether
its approach would be widely accepted.
D. The Second Circuit's Loss Causation Approach
The Second Circuit has not issued a ruling on a case
outlining the standard for loss causation at summary
judgment, but its decision in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc.249 has been utilized in several district court cases to help
establish a standard. In Lentell, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to dismiss the action for failure to
state a claim, because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead
loss causation °.2 " The court held that "a misstatement or
omission is the 'proximate cause' of an investment loss if the
risk that caused the loss was within the zone of risk concealed
by the misrepresentations and omissions alleged by a
disappointed investor."251  Thus, the Second Circuit required
that the loss be both foreseeable and caused by the
244. Id.
245. Id. In depth assessments entail the opinions of expert analysts,
including reference to post-mortem data regarding the market at issue; such as
the use of basic principles of econometrics. Id.
246. Id.
247. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
271 (5th Cir. 2007).
248. Id.
249. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
250. Id. at 167, 178.
251. Id. at 173.
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materialization of the concealed risk.
252
The Second Circuit, in Lentell, distinguished an
announcement's negative effect on the stock price from its
corrective effect on the stock price in the context of loss
causation.2 3 They reasoned that an event, such as a failure
to meet earnings forecasts or a statement, did not mean that
the event disclosed the alleged scheme to the market.25 4 In
other words, a failure to meet earnings forecasts had a
negative effect on stock prices, but not a corrective effect.
2 55
Such a failure did not imply that defendants concealed a
scheme to depress earnings estimates and drive up prices.256
It could not disclose the scheme; therefore, it cannot correct
the artificial inflation caused by the scheme and cannot be
used to adequately establish loss causation.257
This standard has been interpreted in In re Initial Public
Offering Securities Litigation.255 In Initial Public Offering,
investors brought a securities fraud class action against
Credit Suisse, issuers and underwriters, claiming that they
conspired to artificially inflate aftermarket prices of securities
by undervaluation of initial public offerings (IPO's) and
deliberately issuing low revenue forecasting. 25 9 The court
disagreed with plaintiffs, holding that they failed to satisfy
the loss causation standard. 260  The plaintiffs alleged that
"the defendants intentionally discounted earnings estimates
and issued cautionary statements to excite the market and
inflate prices when those estimates were beaten. '261  The
court held that "the single article [plaintiffs pointed],
standing alone, was not specific enough to constitute actual
disclosure of the alleged fraud. '262  The lack of such
disclosures, and accordingly, any sufficient allegations of loss
causation, rendered the complaint insufficient under the
Lentell standard requiring plaintiffs to allege that "the
252. Id.
253. Id. at 174-75.
254. Id.
255. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2005).
256. Id. at 176.
257. Id. at 177-78.
258. In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation 399 F. Supp. 2d 261,
266 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
259. See id. at 263-64.
260. Id. at 265-66.
261. Id. at 266.
262. Id. at 267.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
misstatement or omission concealed something from the
market that, when disclosed, negatively affected the value of
the security."2 63
The Internet Law Library (INL) court loosely followed
Lentell when it extended the standard to summary judgment,
in which private securities causes of action require causal
links between the alleged misstatement and the loss suffered
by the plaintiff.2 64 The court also cited the IPO decision when
it stated that the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff must "be
foreseeable and... [have been] caused by the materialization
of the concealed risk."26 Further, the risk that was concealed
by the misstatement "must be within the zone of risks
concealed by the misstatement."266  Conversely, if the
causation chain is broken by an independent intervening
event, loss causation is not established.2 67 The court held that
the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that
the concealment of the criminal convictions by INL in fact
caused the loss, when the concealed information prevented
the financial transaction from occurring.265
Though the Second Circuit and the district courts under
its jurisdiction appear to be following in the Fifth Circuit's
footsteps, it has not set the same standard requirements for
both the class certification stage and the summary judgment
stage.269  The Second Circuit has no published decisions
evaluating specifically loss causation at summary judgment.
Thus, the Second Circuit would likely have less impact if the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the issue.
263. Id. at 266 (quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d
Cir. 2005)). This decision was also cited by the loss causation summary
judgment decision in Flowserve. Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560, 579
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
264. Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 01-
CV-6600, 2007 WL 1222583 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2005) (citing Lentell, 396
F.3d at 172).
265. Id. at *3 (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d
298, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at *4.
269. See generally Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005)
(providing the general Second Circuit approach to loss causation).
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E. The Third Circuit's Trend Towards a Stricter Standard of
Loss Causation
The Third Circuit's approach requires that plaintiffs
demonstrate that the allegedly fraudulent omissions
proximately caused the economic loss. 27° The Third Circuit
identified its general standard for loss causation with the
decision in McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP" 1 In McCabe,
principals of Applied Tactical Systems (ATS) sued the
auditors of Vertex, the company acquiring ATS, for securities
fraud, common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.2 72
The plaintiffs claimed that there were merger-related stock
registration defaults and threatened litigation associated
with the information that had been omitted from the merger's
financial statements and documentation.2 73 The defendants
moved for, and were granted, summary judgment at the
district court level.2 74  The district court held that the
plaintiffs suffered no damages resulting from the alleged
fraud, thus summary judgment was appropriate as there was
no loss causation; plaintiffs appealed.275
In McCabe, the Third Circuit evaluated the expert
testimony presented by both parties as to whether the alleged
omissions actually caused the plaintiffs economic loss. 276 The
court determined that "to survive summary judgment,.., the
ATS plaintiffs had to create a genuine issue [of material fact]
as to whether [the] registration defaults and the [subsequent]
threats of litigation. . . were a substantial factor in causing..
. economic loss. ''277 The court defined a "substantial factor" as
including "considerations of materiality, directness,
foreseeability and intervening causes."278 The McCabe court
found that the district court had not erred in finding in favor
of the defendants on summary judgment.279
The McCabe court found that the factual record was
"devoid of sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to
270. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 2007).
271. Id. at 424-25.
272. Id. at 422 n.1.
273. Id. at 421.
274. Id. at 423.
275. Id.
276. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 434-38 (3d Cir. 2007).
277. Id. at 436.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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loss causation."280 " '[T]o survive summary judgment, a party
must present more than just "bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions" to show the existence of a genuine
issue [of material fact.]' "281 The court noted that the
plaintiffs expert focused only on the value of ATS at the time
of the merger, but had no opinion on whether the alleged
misrepresentations made by Ernst & Young proximately
caused the price decline in Vertex shares after the merger." 2
Further, neither of the witnesses for ATS attributed the
falling stock price or declining financial performance to the
registration defaults." 3 Evidence of that connection was
required to create a genuine issue of fact, and ATS failed to
provide it. 2 84
Conversely, Vertex provided an expert witness who
demonstrated the Vertex stock price was unaffected by the
registration default disclosures.285  Further, neither the
plaintiffs nor defendant's expert reports demonstrated that
the omissions proximately caused the economic loss. 286 Thus,
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden, and summary
judgment was appropriate.287  The Third Circuit's
requirement for a demonstration that the omissions
proximately caused the economic loss is much like the Fifth
Circuit's requirement that plaintiffs prove that the
defendants' alleged misrepresentations were the proximate
cause of the economic loss to qualify for certification.288 Thus,
this could constitute the Third Circuit's relaxed endorsement
of the Fifth Circuit's standard.
F. The Various Circuits' Standards as Compared to Each
Other
The Third Circuit endorsed the Fifth Circuit's
requirements for proof of proximate causation of economic
280. Id.
281. Id. at 436-37 (quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594
(3d Cir. 2005).




286. See id. at 438.
287. See id.
288. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 2007).
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loss.28 9 In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, the Fifth
Circuit held that the loss causation requirement was
"satisfied in a Rule 10b-5 case only if the misrepresentation
touche[d] upon the reasons for the investment's decline in
value."2 90 The McCabe court held that the Fifth Circuit's
approach was consistent with the Third Circuit's
jurisprudence.29' In addition, the Second Circuit utilized
similar language when it relied on the premise that "a
misstatement or omission is the 'proximate cause' of an
investment loss if the risk that caused the loss was within the
zone of risk concealed by the misrepresentations and
omissions alleged by a disappointed investor. 2 92 By requiring
proof of a proximate cause, the Second Circuit appears to
align itself with the Third and Fifth Circuits. The trend
towards the Fifth Circuit's approach, as furthered by the
Third Circuit's direct endorsement, marks a shift against the
Ninth Circuit's slightly more plaintiff-friendly standard, as
articulated in Daou.
However, the Seventh Circuit has not taken as strong a
position.293 By requiring the defendant to "apportion and
quantify which part of its loss is attributable to disclosures..
and which part might attributable to other factors,"294 the
Seventh Circuit appears to disagree with the fundamentals
behind Dura, that the plaintiff must provide some indication
of a causal connection between the loss and the alleged fraud.
Because the Supreme Court held that that causal connection
was the crutch of loss causation at the pleadings stage, it is
natural to assume that the Supreme Court would require at
least as much, if not more at summary judgment.
IV. PROPOSAL
Both securities fraud plaintiffs and defendants would
benefit from clear-cut guidelines establishing the standard for
loss causation at summary judgment. Currently, defendants
289. Id.
290. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981),
affd in part, rev'd in part 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
291. McCabe, 494 F.3d at 428.
292. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2004).
293. See Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475
F.3d 824, 842-44 (7th Cir. 2007).
294. In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 501, 551 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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have no way of gauging the court's response to a summary
judgment motion, while plaintiffs struggle with a wild card
pleading standard. However, the pleading standard for the
Seventh Circuit's standard of evaluating loss causation at
summary judgment, as described in its decision in Ray, is the
most unambiguous post-Dura loss causation standard and
represents a middle-of-the-road approach.295 As previously
stated, the Ray court examined three ways plaintiffs can
demonstrate loss causation: (1) the materialization of the risk
standard,2 96 (2) the fraud on the market standard, 29' and (3)
the risk-free approach.298  These three approaches, as
distinguished by the Seventh Circuit, allow the
compartmentalization of claims under each standard, giving
plaintiffs and defendants notice of what they need to allege
and substantiate at the summary judgment level.
It may be inappropriate to analyze market declines
thoroughly at the pleadings stage, before the discovery
process permits evidentiary support or comprehensive
understanding, but the summary judgment stage must be the
point where those facts are plead with particularity.
Plaintiffs have had the chance to effectively research the
issue and analyze information produced by the company, and
thus should be able to sufficiently state their case. Because it
is widely thought that the stock market promptly impounds
all publicly available information,299 plaintiffs must be able to
point to a corrective disclosure, and causally connect a
measurable amount of loss to that disclosure to survive
summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit's requirement of "some empirically-
295. See generally Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., 482 F.3d 991 (7th Cir.
2007).
296. The materialization of the risk standard requires plaintiffs to prove that
"it was the very facts about which the defendant lied which caused [the
plaintiffs] injuries." Id. (quoting Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113
F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1997)).
297. See supra note 199.
298. Ray, 482 F.3d at 995.
299. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (applying the
efficient capital market theory); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (citing studies); Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373,
374-81 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities
Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 (1982)
(citing literature on efficient-capital-market theory).
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based showing that the corrective disclosure was more than
just present at the scene,"300 is clear. While it has not
received broad attention and is more defendant-friendly than
the Dura decision, requiring empirical proof is appropriate at
summary judgment because it should be a requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate a definite link in causation after they
have had ample opportunities to gather evidence. If plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate a link, then they have failed to establish
an element of the case and summary judgment should be
granted for defendants. The Seventh Circuit's holding also
offers clear guidelines, by outlining the proof necessary to
satisfy each separate claim, and follows the holding in
Dura °1 Therefore, as a standard, the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Ray as well as its reliance on Caremark, should be
coupled with the Fifth Circuit's standard for loss causation at
summary judgment.
A combination of the two circuits would create a clear
standard that would reflect Congress's intent. Plaintiffs
would first be required to demonstrate loss causation with
some particularity and in-depth expert analysis. 2  Once this
was established, the burden would rest with the defense to
rebut this demonstration by apportioning and quantifying
which parts of the loss was attributable to disclosures, and
which part to other factors. This standard would accurately
reflect the spirit of Dura, which required plaintiffs to make
the first showing, while also giving the defense a chance to
respond which reflects the spirit of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is reasonable to expect a securities fraud plaintiff to
detail particular causes of a stock's loss at summary
judgment. This creates a vehicle for valid fraud cases, while
mitigating the dangers of strike suits, 30 3 forcing defendants
into settlement. The Dura decision alleviated the risk of
senseless harm to innocent companies and investors at the
pleadings stage, and promulgated a legitimate private anti-
300. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
271 (5th Cir. 2007).
301. Ray, 482 F.3d at 994-95.
302. See supra Parts III.A, III.C.
303. Feinstein, supra note 160, at 864 (discussing the potential for plaintiffs
abuse of the securities fraud claim).
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fraud litigation system to restore investor confidence.30 4 The
Supreme Court in Dura expressly left open the continued
development of the law on causation,35 which the district and
circuit courts have taken up with the recent flurry of
litigation to try and develop a standard. However, the
various circuits have disagreed upon an appropriate
interpretation of Dura at the summary judgment phase, thus
we can expect that the Supreme Court may soon take up the
issue to settle the split to create uniformity.
The standard for loss causation at summary judgment in
a securities fraud case is far from established, and the various
tests and standards utilized by the different circuit and
district courts demonstrate that the issue will come to a head
soon. While it is a complex issue, and there are few district
court or circuit court decisions on point, the cases that do
address loss causation at summary judgment provide strong
guidance. Loss causation must clearly define what does and
does not establish proof of a "causal connection" or "nexus"
between the loss suffered by the plaintiff and the defendant's
alleged misstatements to survive summary judgment.30 6
If the loss causation standard remains undefined, the
causational uncertainty in securities fraud cases vastly
increases the potential for "strike suits."3 7 With the current
cases on appeal and the various standards coming out of the
different circuits, the issue should be ripe for United States
Supreme Court review. A combination of the Fifth and
Seventh Circuit's standards would be the most appropriate
standard to adopt. Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a
causal connection through an empirical showing is
appropriate after plaintiffs have been given access to
evidence. However, giving defendants a chance to rebut that
presumption by demonstrating independent causes for the
loss, separate from any alleged fraud would avoid costly and
unnecessary litigation. This would help to discourage strike
suits while permitting meritorious suits to go forward and
304. Oleg Cross, Sidebar Comment, The Unlikely Tort of "Securities Fraud":




305. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
306. McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 820 (9th Cir. 1992).
307. Feinstein, supra note 160, at 864.
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would further the goals of Congress and of the private
securities lOb-5 cause of action.

